

Police Agreements and Experiences with Measures Relating to Cocaine Trafficking in the Context of Ethnic Albanian Criminal Networks and the Caribbean

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As part of the EU-funded *CAP1* (Caribbean-Albanian Poly-criminal Offshore Network Elicitation) project (co-funded by the European Commission from the ISF), various methods – both IT-based and “classic” investigative measures – are currently being used (January 2025 to December 2026) to pursue two main objectives: On the one hand, the legal basis for transnational investigations is being analysed in the light of international legal principles. On the other hand, *in-rem* and *in-situ* activities are being carried out simultaneously in the Caribbean and Albanian regions in order to identify possible additions and added value of a nexus-related methodology that needs to be systematised.¹

On Project CAP1

Led by the University of Applied Sciences for Public Administration Bremen (HfÖV),² the Institute for Police and Security Research (IPoS)³ is currently implementing a consortium project in cooperation with the topic-specific research groups of the *Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in Crime Investigations and Criminal Justice (CCICJ)*⁴, is currently implementing a consortium project with the aim of gaining structural insights into the thematic nexus of “illegal cocaine trafficking from South/Latin/Central America via the Caribbean islands, mainly affiliated with the Netherlands, by Albanian criminal networks”. This project is multi-layered in terms of content, subject matter, personnel and time, so that at this point in time it is not possible to summarise a comprehensive report on the results here, but rather to present an interim report.

This topic is of particular interest to law enforcement agencies that are located close to ports and are also considered to be highly relevant in terms of goods handling volumes. In the context of the CAP1 project, Bremerhaven (and Hamburg, although not represented in the project) are therefore the most notable consortium partners in this regard.⁵ The Bremerhaven Local Police Authority (OPB BHV), in cooperation with the Bremen State Criminal Police Office (LKA Bremen), is also a consortium partner in the CAP1 project, as is the Albanian State Police (ASP).

As this is an EU-funded project originating from the ISF, the EU dimension of the initiatives underlying this project cannot go unmentioned (without going into further detail here): *EL PACTO*,⁶ *EU-CELAC*,⁷ and *MAOC-N*.⁸

¹ <https://ipos-research.eu/project/cap1>

² www.hfoev.bremen.de

³ www.ipos-research.eu

⁴ www.hfoev.bremen.de/forschung/jean-monnet-center-of-excellence-crime-investigations-and-criminal-justice-ccicj-16618

⁵ <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/239221/umfrage/groesste-haefen-in-deutschland-nach-gueterumschlag>

⁶ [www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)762286](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762286)

⁷ www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-celac-roadmap-summits_en

⁸ <https://maoc.eu>

Agreements between European States and South America

Particular attention should be paid to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC);⁹ however, unlike typical association or free trade agreements, there is no single contractual basis that gathers or even binds all (33) CELAC states,¹⁰ the member states of the EU (27) and, at the same time, the latter (1): Instead, cooperation consists of a multitude of partial agreements, initiatives and political declarations – with inconsistent participation/membership and varying content (including security). During the CAP1 project, criminal networks are identified and individual actors are examined – but this is not the subject of this article. Instead, it focuses on addressing the legal basis and determining the status quo in light of the principle of legality¹¹ in order to aim for a sufficient status quo post: interjurisdictional agreements.

In addition to these EU-led initiatives, European states have surprisingly few agreements in the judicial and policing field with regard to South, Central and Latin America and the Caribbean: **Antigua and Barbuda** with Finland (2017); **Argentina** with Belgium (1888), Denmark (2001), France (1998, 2011), Italy (2001), Portugal (2003), Romania and Spain (2000, 1987, 1881); **Bahamas** with Austria (1963, 1985), Belgium (1979) and Italy (1873); **Bolivia** with Belgium (1908), Italy (1901), Spain (1997, 1990); **Brazil** with Austria (2014), Belgium (1958), France (1996), Greece (2013), Italy (1993, 1998), Poland (2016), Portugal (2001), Romania (2001), Spain (2004, 1988), Switzerland (2004); **Chile** with Belgium (1958), Netherlands (2006), Poland (2007), Romania (2005), Spain (1998, 2015, 1992), Switzerland (2006); **Colombia** with Belgium (1968), France (1997, 1850), Spain (1892, 1997), Switzerland (2011); **Costa Rica** with Belgium (1958), Italy (1875), Spain (1997); **Cuba** with Austria (1999), Czechia (1980), France (1998, 1925), Hungary (1981), Italy (1932), Poland (1982), Romania (1981), Slovakia (1980), Spain (1998, 1905); **Dominican Republic** with Spain (2002; 1981); Ecuador with Belgium (1889), France (1937), Spain (2000, 1989), Sweden (2015), Switzerland (1997); **El Salvador** with Spain (1997), Switzerland (1883); **Guatemala** with Belgium (1960), Spain (2001, 1895); **Honduras** with Belgium (1901), Spain (2002); **Mexico** with Belgium (1939), France (1977, 1994), Germany (1956), Greece (1999), Italy (1991, 2002/2011, 1899), Netherlands (1907), Poland (2002, 2003), Portugal (2018, 1998), Romania (1999), Spain (1997, 2006, 1978, 2000, 1998, 2018), Switzerland (2005); **Nicaragua** with Belgium (1907), Spain (1997); **Panama** with Spain (1999); **Paraguay** with Austria (1907), Belgium (1929), France (1997), Hungary (1907), Italy (1911), Portugal (2003), Spain (1998), Switzerland (1906); **Peru** with Belgium (1961), France (2012), Italy (2020, 1935), Portugal (2010), Romania (1999), Spain (1999, 1989), Switzerland (1997); **San Salvador** with Italy (1872); **Suriname** with Belgium (1895), Netherlands (1976); **Uruguay** with France (1996), Italy (1881), Spain (2002, 1996, 1991), Switzerland (1923); **Venezuela** with Belgium (1885), Denmark (2000), France (2012), Italy (1932), Netherlands (1996), Spain (1989).¹²

It is clear, at least, that by no means the entire relevant geographical area is covered by operationally relevant agreements at the intergovernmental level.

In the Caribbean region, it has been recognised that “regional threats require a regional approach”. Experts note that weapons can be easily transported between islands, that social media

⁹ www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-celac-roadmap-summits_en

¹⁰ www.consilium.europa.eu/de/infographics/eu-celac-relations

¹¹ see in particular European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng

¹² Reprinted with references and explanations in: Holland, T. B. et al., International Investigations: Police Agreements between Member States of the European Security Union (including third countries), Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaften 2024; categorisation and typology will be carried out as part of the CAP1 project.

connects youth groups on different islands, and that drug routes quickly shift when police pressure increases [...]. Experts placed these developments in a broader context. They showed how the Caribbean is changing: the region is no longer just a transit route, but is increasingly becoming part of the logistics chain for cocaine and other illegal goods. *The Caribbean has become a platform for the storage, repackaging and redistribution of cocaine. They also emphasised the link between drug trafficking and arms smuggling*¹³.

In the *Western Balkans*, such close cross-border cooperation between law enforcement authorities on the basis of agreements is consistently in place;¹⁴ background to this is that the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU, which are preparatory to accession, stipulate close interregional cooperation (with explicit reference to the fight against drug trafficking).¹⁵

Overall, there are *many agreements between the Member States of the AFSJ and South, Central and Latin American countries* – with Italy, Portugal and Spain being particularly noteworthy in this regard –¹⁶ but the mere existence of numerous agreements with a potentially relevant geographical focus in the given nexus (at least in the case of some states) alone still appears insufficient in 2025 in light of the requirements of the principle of legality.

In the context of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC), the UN decided to focus on police cooperation: “States parties are urged to make use of the Organized Crime Convention, as well as applicable bilateral and multi-lateral agreements or arrangements, as a basis for law enforcement cooperation in relation to offences covered by the Convention and the Protocols thereto” – this goes hand in hand with a request („identifying and supporting *practical ways to facilitate international cooperation*”)¹⁷.

Germany’s Agreements

The federal states have concluded purely domestic agreements that extend beyond state borders,¹⁸ and the Federal Republic of Germany, as a subject of international law, currently has (only) one police-related agreement with Brazil in South, Central and Latin America,¹⁹ with

¹³ Drayer, D., *Veertig specialisten bespreken grensoverschrijdende misdaad in regio*, 03.12.2025, www.curacao.nu/nieuws/politie-justitie/83002/veertig-specialisten-bespreken-grensoverschrijdende-misdaad-in-regio

¹⁴ See, for example, the relationship between Albania and Kosovo: Police Cooperation Agreement of 6 October 2009 (a fundamental agreement on cross-border police cooperation between Albania and Kosovo); Cooperation Memorandum for summer 2016 (allows joint deployment of officials from both countries – in particular for traffic controls and prevention during the tourism/summer season); Agreement on forensic cooperation from 2018 (cooperation between the forensic institution of Kosovo and the Albanian police/forensics, exchange of experts, laboratory capacities, scientific police work). Also at the institutional level: Joint Police Cooperation Centre at the Morinë-Vermicë border crossing – Joint Police Cooperation Centre, JPC/JBCP (establishment of a joint coordination centre for police and border authorities of both states to enable information exchange and joint control).

¹⁵ See, for example, Art. 12ff. and in particular Art. 4 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, OJ No. L 107 of 28 April 2009, pp. 166502; [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22009A0428\(02\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22009A0428(02))

¹⁶ Holland, T. B. et al., *Internationale Ermittlungen: Polizeiabkommen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Sicherheitsunion (unter Einbeziehung von Drittstaaten)*, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaften, 2024

¹⁷ UN, Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Report on the meeting of the Working Group on International Cooperation held in Vienna on 11 and 12 September 2023, Recommendation (g); www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/International_Cooperation_2023/CTOC_CO_P_WG.3_2023_4/CTOC_COP_WG.3_2023_4_E.pdf

¹⁸ See, for example, Abkommen über die erweiterte Zuständigkeit der Polizei der Länder bei der Strafverfolgung, www.transparenz.bremen.de/metainformationen/abkommen-ueber-die-erweiterte-zustaendigkeit-der-polizei-der-laender-bei-der-strafverfolgung-vom-8-november-1991-73808?template=20_gp_ifg_meta_detail_d

¹⁹ cf. www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2024/kw26-de-rechtshilfe-brasilien-1009952; www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2024/02/brasilien.html

another agreement with Mexico currently in the process of being drawn up²⁰; However, there are several police cooperation agreements with direct neighbouring countries.²¹ The many bilateral agreements on police cooperation should not be replaced by these measures, at least from the point of view of the federal states: “From the point of view of the Federal Council, a legally binding implementation of the proposed recommendation makes sense in the long term. However, it must be made clear that these are minimum standards for police operational cooperation, which can be supplemented at any time by bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements. [...] The proposed recommendation and its implementation must therefore preserve the existing bilateral and multilateral regulations and continue to allow for such regulations – including those that go beyond them – in the future”²².

In view of the geographical focus of the CAP1 project, the agreement between Germany and the Kingdom of the *Netherlands* was initially relevant.²³ This is primarily characterised by its focus on the actual German-Dutch *border region* (border areas within the meaning of the agreement are, in Lower Saxony, the district of the Osnabrück police headquarters and, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the districts and independent cities in the administrative districts of Düsseldorf, Cologne and Münster, and in the Kingdom of the Netherlands the police regions of Groningen, Drenthe, Twente, IJsselland, Noord- en Oost Gelderland, Gelderland Midden, Gelderland Zuid, Limburg Noord, Limburg Zuid, the areas for which the Wadden Sea and North Sea units of the Korps Landelijke Politiediensten are responsible, Art. 3). No further territorial specifications are made, in particular with regard to the OCTs and their individual legal status in terms of criminal prosecution (not even in the intended amendments)²⁴.²⁵ This agreement is one of a series of agreements between Germany and its immediate neighbours (the same applies to police cooperation between Germany and *France* and the relevant OCTs in the *Caribbean region*).²⁶ Similarly, the agreement between Europol and the Netherlands does not provide any further information.²⁷

Germany's agreement with *Albania* (2013) is divided into 14 articles; Article 1 contains a non-exhaustive list of criminal offences, which should be read in the context of Article 3 on narcotics-related crime – a provision that does not exist in other comparable agreements; Overall, however, this agreement is similar to other agreements with non-EU countries that have been concluded with (South) Eastern European countries in particular due to the frequency of cases.

The agreement covers the entire Albanian and German jurisdictions, but with regard to the authorities involved in its implementation/application, it is restrictive in nature (Art. 6), i.e. limited to the federal level: Federal Ministry of the Interior; Federal Ministry of Finance; Federal Ministry of Health; Federal Criminal Police Office; Federal Police Headquarters; Customs Criminal Investigation Office; Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices. It is widely applied, with a liaison officer from Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) based in Albania – and,

²⁰ www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/presse/hib/2015-11/396562-396562

²¹ Holland, T. B. et al., *Internationale Ermittlungen: Polizeiabkommen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Sicherheitsunion (unter Einbeziehung von Drittstaaten)*, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaften 2024

²² <https://dserver.bundestag.de/brd/2022/0004-1-22.pdf>

²³ Vertrag vom 2. März 2005 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Königreich der Niederlande über die grenzüberschreitende polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit und die Zusammenarbeit in strafrechtlichen Angelegenheiten; <https://dip.bundestag.de/vorgang/gesetz-zu-dem-vertrag-vom-2-märz-2005-zwischen-der/395>

²⁴ www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2024/12/dt-ndl-vertrag.html

²⁵ cf. chapter 7 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; www.government.nl/documents/reports/2019/02/28/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands

²⁶ <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/13/101/1310113.pdf>

²⁷ <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001354/1998-11-01>; in particular, Articles 63 and 70 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, pp. 53-114.

as the CAP1 project has shown, keeping very busy – in varying formations, an observation that the CAP1 team can confirm over the past ten years.

None of these agreements explicitly include provisions on the use of IT-based investigation methods. At least based on the investigative focus of the CAP1 project, it should be noted from the findings of this project that future agreements should also describe which IT-based measures (without reducing them to specific application methodologies or even product-related methods) should be permitted, e.g. with regard to open source intelligence (OSInt), social media intelligence (SocMInt), signals intelligence (SigInt), geospatial intelligence (GeoInt) and imagery intelligence (IMInt) – which, together with “classical” information gathering methods (human intelligence, HumInt), constitute the holistic field of all-source intelligence – so that data protection aspects of such agreements are subject to adjustment or opened up to the (extended?) inclusion of technical developments.²⁸

Lack of Consideration of Innovative Technologies

According to Article 16(1) TFEU, every person has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them, and according to paragraph 2, the Union legislator is not only entitled to adopt secondary legislation to this effect. Declaration No 21 ‘on the protection of personal data in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation’ makes it clear that the need to adopt special rules was anticipated for judicial and police cooperation within the meaning of Article 67 et seq. TFEU.

Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also states that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them, which, according to paragraph 2, may only be processed ‘in good faith for specified purposes and with the consent of the person concerned or on some other legitimate basis laid down by law’.

The secondary legal provisions are derived from these legal bases: ***Regulation 2016/679*** (GDPR) is relevant to law enforcement authorities in its application, even if the provisions of ***Directive 2016/680*** (JHA Directive) are to be considered as having priority of application here; Recitals No. 19 of Regulation 2016/679 and No. 11 of Directive 2016/680 make this sufficiently clear. However, these legal bases do not contain any separate provisions for OSInt; rather, such analysis falls under the definition that data processing includes any operation performed with or without the aid of automated procedures that involves personal data, which is any direct or indirect information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (cf. Art. 3 Directive 2016/680 and Art. 4 Regulation 2016/679).

The use of OSInt methods, for example, for law enforcement purposes is not exclusively restricted to one (or more) competent ***authority***(ies) – legally ***mandated private institutions*** may also become involved here (Art. 3 No. 7 Directive 2016/680); the authority is then considered the ***data controller***, which must comply with the provisions of Directive 2016/680 (Art. 3 No. 8), and a participating private institution is considered the ***processor*** (Art. 3 No. 9).

The fact that a typologised, differentiated approach will soon be necessary here is illustrated by the following widely divergent interpretations of the term: In the legal sense, there is a considerable lack of relevant literature on the subject matter of this article; in 2023, Weingarten wrote in the context of Section 161 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) that this allows OSInt research “which, if necessary, enables the targeted and systematic procurement of freely available information in global data networks using the entire spectrum of publicly accessible information channels, possibly with the use of special search tools, and through which a wealth of further information and investigative approaches can be obtained [...] An intervention in the right to informational self-determination that requires legitimisation under special law occurs

²⁸ cf. CAP1, *Investigative Measures Report*, 2026

when a government agency accesses access-protected communication content using access data that it has obtained against or without the will of an authorised person [...]”²⁹. The proposal for an EU regulation ‘on strengthening police cooperation’ from 2023 uses the term OSInt as follows: “Open source intelligence (OSINT)/social media monitoring, which monitors freely accessible sources and social media, analyses social networks and provides related operational specialist services to support the investigations and preventive measures of Member States [...]”³⁰.

According to Section 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following applies: “If a measure under this Act is only permissible in the case of suspicion of certain criminal offences, the personal data obtained on the basis of a corresponding measure under other laws may only be used for evidentiary purposes in criminal proceedings without the consent of the persons affected by the measure for the purpose of investigating criminal offences for which such a measure could have been ordered under this Act”. This provision was drafted against the backdrop of “classical” investigation methods carried out exclusively by humans, but does not exclude the use of special investigation methods (Section 100a StPO) per se – the definition of measures under Section 100s StPO (“[...] Surveillance and recording of telecommunications may also be carried out by means of technical intervention in information technology systems used by the person concerned [...]”) is not appropriate in the context of the methodology and specific methods that fall under the OSInt concept and practical application, for example.

In light of the increasing importance of elements that can be attributed to the area of “e-evidence”³¹, there is also a need for action in light of the requirement for legal reservation.

In any case, it must be ensured that the permissible technology does not involve *automated decision-making* within the meaning of data protection provisions (in particular Art. 11 of Directive 2016/680): It must not be a sui generis consequence, but rather an additional investigative method that supplements HumInt and helps to identify, categorise and make available to the lead investigator in a structured manner large amounts of data generated from the web in all its facets. In many available applications, the use of *artificial intelligence* is not necessarily intended, but it can be a component (this depends on the respective programme and its functions activated in each individual case); furthermore, the use of artificial intelligence might be of interest in the case of automated (recommendations for) decision-making, but the OSInt methodology does not even provide for logic such as that found in commercial *LegalTech, FinTech, RegTech or MedTech* applications.

Essence: The Design

During the implementation of the CAP1 project, it was found that “the connection between the nexus within the RdFSR would have to be developed in institutional, personal and staffing terms”, so it should be emphasised at this point that police agreements at local level would be a promising addition to those at federal level; *it therefore seems appropriate – as desired by the police forces involved in the project – to create contractual legal bases for inter-institutional agreements between relevant jurisdictions (e.g. Bremerhaven/LKA Bremen and ASP, respectively Curaçao), which primarily address local law enforcement agencies.*

²⁹ Weingarten, StPO § 161: Allgemeine Ermittlungsbefugnis der Staatsanwaltschaft, Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, 9. Auflage 2023; MwN

³⁰ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the stepping up of police cooperation with a view to preventing, detecting and investigating the smuggling and trafficking of human beings and increasing support for Europol’s role in preventing and combating these crimes and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794 COM/2023/754 final

³¹ cf. www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/e-evidence; Holland, T. B., Zirkel, C., *Zur Nutzung digitaler Techniken in Justiz und Strafverfolgung: Deutsche Initiativen im Rahmen des europäischen Gefüges*, Kriminalistik 1/2026

This approach goes hand in hand with the “reference to cooperation between police authorities as a non-mandatory and voluntary form of cooperation, as opposed to formal forms of cooperation such as mutual legal assistance and extradition”.³² *This emphasised “optional nature” – interpreted here as “a measure not prescribed by the state itself, but based on an inter-agency administrative agreement” – appears interesting in that it addresses a lower-threshold approach to the exchange of factual information for investigative purposes than currently existing mutual legal assistance agreements (Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements, MLA):* „Legal and procedural disparities slow cooperation; practitioners cite delays of six to twelve months for the application of MLA requests, often rendering evidence obsolete“³³.

Such agreements would therefore supplement existing agreements at the local level rather than replace them. It would also be necessary to consider whether such agreements could be opened up so that other institutions could subsequently join them – possibly not purely law enforcement agencies, but also international organisations, private (commercial) and non-governmental associations founded by civil society.

‘Enhanced cooperation’ between local law enforcement authorities that is not limited to immediate border regions would not conflict with the *Prüm Treaty*³⁴.

This would also be in line with the ‘spirit’ of the current Europol framework: “Subject to the conditions laid down by the Member States, including prior involvement of the national authority, Member States may, however, authorise direct contacts between their competent authorities and Europol”³⁵ – the involvement of Europol and local police forces as key players would substantiate the design of the AFSJ and focus it on the operational level relevant to the facts of each case.

Furthermore, neither the *BKAG*³⁶ nor the *BPolG*³⁷ would stand in the way of such a proposal in Germany: police officers from local authorities are already deployed abroad on a “situational” basis, thus complementing the element of “permanent” liaison officers at federal level. It should also be noted that there are agreements in the police context between the Free State of *Bavaria* and *North Macedonia* as well as *Albania*³⁸ (third country reference) and between *North Rhine-Westphalia* and *Romania* that are not entirely incomparable.

Although the special features of the Dutch constitution³⁹ would have to be taken into account with regard to (partial) jurisdictions such as *Curaçao*, a blueprint already exists in relation to *Albania*, for example. It is noteworthy that AFSJ-relevant agreements exist between Curaçao

³² UN, Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, *Report on the meeting of the Working Group on International Cooperation* held in Vienna on 11 and 12 September 2023, Rec. 12, www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/International_Cooperation_2023/CTOC_COP_WG.3_2023_4/CTOC_COP_WG.3_2023_4_E.pdf

³³ cf. CAPI, *Legal Mechanisms Report*, 2026

³⁴ cf. Art. 47 (2) Vertrag zwischen dem Königreich Belgien, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, dem Königreich Spanien, der Französischen Republik, dem Großherzogtum Luxemburg, dem Königreich der Niederlande und der Republik Österreich über die Vertiefung der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, insbesondere zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, der grenzüberschreitenden Kriminalität und der illegalen Migration, BGBl. II, Nr. 19, 2006; www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/248576/d78c8aeecdbf3f9d29e020e9bb510b87/vertragstextbgbl-data.pdf

³⁵ *ibid.*, Art. 7(5)

³⁶ cf. § 3 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz vom 1. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I S. 1354; 2019 I S. 400), zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 des Gesetzes vom 17. Juli 2025 (BGBl. 2025 I Nr. 172)

³⁷ cf. Bundespolizeigesetz vom 19. Oktober 1994 (BGBl. I S. 2978, 2979), zuletzt geändert durch Art. 5 des Gesetzes vom 6. Mai 2024 (BGBl. 2024 I Nr. 149)

³⁸ cf. www.stmi.bayern.de/news/detail/engere-zusammenarbeit-zwischen-bayern-und-albanien/

³⁹ <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/ronl-a11e0f7e6531059e36685f1ca1c8572ac682d01e/pdf>

and *Estonia*⁴⁰ and *Latvia*⁴¹ on *cooperation in customs matters*; such agreements would be particularly desirable in the context of German port cities – e.g. Bremerhaven – and it is surprising that they have not already been agreed, given that other AFSJ member states have them, even though the number of cases is still more attributable to the German legal area.⁴²

From a German perspective, the Federal Foreign Office would definitely need to be involved in the process of drafting such an agreement (not only to take into account the permissible terminology, e.g. with regard to the terms ‘agreement’ and ‘memorandum’), but the operational law enforcement agencies would have freedom to determine the content when drafting such agreements.

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Both teach at the HfÖV police academy on topics related to international investigations, primarily in the context of the **CCICJ**, in cooperation with **I2SM** and **IRIS** e.V. They are also active in the CAP1 project consortium partner Civic Institute to Promote Order and Society (**CIPOS**), based in Curaçao.



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⁴⁰ <https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/nl/Verdrag/Details/012905>

⁴¹ <https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/nl/Verdrag/Details/012893>

⁴² See, for example, Maihold, G., *Europas Häfen und der internationale Kokainhandel: Weshalb Verbrechensbekämpfung auch der Resilienz von Logistikplattformen bedarf*, SWP-Aktuell 2024, www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/europas-haefen-und-der-internationale-kokainhandel